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Abstract 
This contribution discusses the preliminary ruling in Coty (C-230/16) in which the European Court of 
Justice addresses competition law ambiguities pertaining to selective distribution, in particular with 
respect to the use of third-party online platforms as a distribution channel. Importantly, the judgment 
confirms that suppliers of luxury products can prohibit authorised distributors from selling goods on 
general online platforms. This contribution analyses the ruling and discusses selective distribution, 
preserving a luxury or prestigious product image, and vertical agreements in the context of e-
commerce.  
 




Online sales and distribution are highly topical as EU competition law issues. The EU Digital Single 
Market (DSM) Strategy seeks to boost e-commerce and, as a corollary, to tackle competition concerns 
in digital markets. According to the European Commission (Commission), e-commerce still holds 
untapped potential, but it can notably benefit both companies and consumers, especially if central 
legal issues are optimally resolved.1  
 
The increasing significance of online distribution affects the practices of undertakings in terms of 
control over the retail sale of their products. Suppliers may begin to analyse whether they should 
engage more actively in distribution and retail, whether selective distribution systems would be 
useful, and what the policy should be with respect to selling products to consumers via general, 
independent online platforms or marketplaces such as Amazon or eBay.2 The practical implications of 
these issues affect both consumers and dealers in the distribution chain. 
 
The preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Coty3 was expected to clarify some 
of the contemporary legal problems of selective distribution, third-party online platforms, and luxury 
products.4 Selective distribution refers to  
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“a distribution system where the supplier undertakes to sell the contract goods or services, 
either directly or indirectly, only to distributors selected on the basis of specified criteria and 
where these distributors undertake not to sell such goods or services to unauthorised 
distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system”.5   
 
Selective distribution is used in the context of high-quality goods (as broadly understood) and where 
maintaining a brand image and/or ensuring correct use of products is central. Under EU competition 
law, vertical agreements on selective distribution may fall entirely outside the scope of the prohibition 
of art.101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Further, even if a particular vertical 
agreement is caught by art.101(1) TFEU, it may still be acceptable (exempted) on the basis of 
art.101(3) TFEU,6 as further elaborated by block exemptions, in particular the Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation 330/2010 (VBER).7  
 
Selective distribution systems that meet the so-called “Metro criteria” are not competition 
infringements within the meaning of art.101(1) TFEU. The Metro test requires that distributors are 
chosen on the basis of objective qualitative criteria that are uniform for all potential resellers and 
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, that product characteristics necessitate a selective distribution 
system—for example to preserve quality—and that the criteria laid down do not go beyond what is 
necessary.8 Before Coty, ambiguity existed regarding the distribution of luxury or prestige products 
and assessment under art.101(1) TFEU: paragraph 46 of the Pierre Fabre judgment, which concerned 
cosmetics and personal care products, makes what seems like a clear statement that maintaining a 
prestigious product image is not a legitimate aim that would justify restricting competition.9 If read 
without the factual and legal context of the case, this passage might create confusion. Nevertheless, as 
explained in Coty, the statement in Pierre Fabre is context-specific and concerns the treatment of a 
particular contract clause (a total online sales ban) but not justifications for selective distribution 
systems in general.10 Coty confirms that a restraint aimed at preserving a luxury image may well be 
compatible with art.101(1) TFEU. 
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Restrictions on using the internet for distribution constitute a theme that intertwines with—and 
extends beyond—issues of selective distribution. The primary approach of EU competition law is 
stringent as to online (re)sale restrictions or restrictions on a distributor’s right to use the internet: 
these are easily seen as illicit restrictions of competition under art.101(1) TFEU. An absolute ban on 
online sales (even by an authorised distributor itself) was found to constitute a competition restriction 
“by object” in Pierre Fabre.11 Nevertheless, imposing less significant restrictions, or restrictions that 
are truly legitimate considering the nature of contract products, may, subject to case-contextual 
assessment, be compatible with art.101(1) TFEU.12 In case a vertical agreement is caught by 
art.101(1) TFEU, and the applicability of exemptions (art.101(3) TFEU and the 
VBER) therefore needs to be analysed, restrictions on online sales may be considered hardcore 
restrictions which remove the benefit of the block exemption.13 
 
Before Coty, the issue has been open as to how online marketplace bans, express or de facto, 
concerning third party-operated platforms should be evaluated in the context of selective distribution. 
Both the evaluation under art.101(1) TFEU and the applicability of exemptions (art.101(3) TFEU and 
the VBER) have been unclear.14 Guidance by the ECJ is invaluable, as ambiguities in EU law create 
the risk, and indeed even a prevalence, of divergent interpretations and conclusions in Member 
States.15 The significance of earlier case law has not been evident due to a lack of clarity as to the 
relevance of the difference between prohibiting use of third-party platforms and a total online sales 
ban. Moreover, as regards exemptions in particular, one of the most detailed EU law sources 
discussing relevant themes has been a soft law document, namely the Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints (Vertical Guidelines), which describes how the Commission interprets the law.16 
 
The Commission, which analysed online marketplace or platform bans in its E-commerce Sector 
Inquiry, has suggested that the distinction between own websites and third-party platforms is decisive 
from the standpoint of competition rules. The Commission submits that online marketplace bans need 
to be analysed on a case-by-case basis as to their overall compatibility with EU competition law, and 
should not be regarded as hardcore restrictions under arts 4(b)–4(c) of the VBER.17 In Coty, the ECJ’s 
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reasoning is similarly constructed. The ruling indicates that a selective distribution agreement 
prohibiting the use of third-party platforms in a discernible manner cannot automatically be 
considered problematic (neither under art.101(1) TFEU nor under art.4 of the VBER). 
 
In brief, the Coty judgment provides much-needed clarification on selective distribution. Additionally, 
the detailed Opinion by Advocate General (AG) Wahl, essentially followed by the ECJ, involves a 
systematic analysis of relevant EU law. 
 
Further Notes on the VBER 
 
The VBER sets out—pursuant to art.101(3) TFEU and subject to more detailed conditions—that the 
prohibition on competition-restricting agreements in art.101(1) TFEU will not apply to vertical 
restrictions in vertical agreements (VBER art.2). Agreements that include hardcore restrictions may 
not benefit from this block exemption (VBER art.4). A vertical agreement that aims to restrict the 
territory in which, or the customers to whom, a retailer may sell contract goods generally removes the 
benefit of the block exemption.18 However, as an exception, art.4(b)(iii) allows “restriction of sales by 
the members of a selective distribution system to unauthorised distributors within the territory 
reserved by the supplier to operate that system”, thus signifying that the core ideas underpinning 
selective distribution are compatible with the block exemption. 
 
In general, the provisions of the VBER on restrictions that remove the benefit of the block exemption 
concern both offline and online sales.19 In terms of background to Coty, it may be further noted that 
retail level members of a selective distribution system cannot be restricted regarding active or passive 
sales to end-users—and that prohibiting online sales significantly hinders passive sales.20 Nonetheless, 
imposing quality standards upon distributors’ online sales is compatible with the VBER.21 
 
Coty: Facts and Background  
 
The main proceedings in Coty concerned a dispute between the applicant, Coty Germany GmbH 
(Coty), a supplier of luxury cosmetics, and the defendant, Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (Akzente), an 
authorised distributor, over a contract clause prohibiting retailers from using a non-authorised third 
party in the context of internet sales. In applying a selective distribution network contract and a 
supplemental agreement, Coty had brought an action before a national court of first instance, the 
Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt-am-Main Regional Court), seeking an order prohibiting 
Akzente from distributing contract products via the “amazon.de” platform.22 After the national court 
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dismissed the application—finding the relevant contractual clause contrary to art.101(1) TFEU and 
the corresponding national provision—Coty appealed that decision.23 
 
The court hearing the appeal, the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt-am-Main Higher 
Regional Court), was aware of the legal ambiguities outlined above. Further, the appellate court 
observed that relevant EU law, and the judgment in Pierre Fabre in particular, had been the subject of 
divergent interpretations by national competition authorities and courts.24 The national court, 
therefore, decided to stay the proceedings and refer four questions for a preliminary ruling. The first 
question inquired, from the standpoint of art.101(1) TFEU, about the general evaluation of selective 
distribution systems that have as their aim the distribution of luxury goods and primarily serve to 
ensure a “luxury image” for the goods.25 In essence, the issue was whether safeguarding a luxury 
image is a legitimate reason for imposing restrictions. The second question continued by inquiring 
whether it constitutes  
 
“an aspect of competition that is compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU if the members of a 
selective distribution system operating at the retail level of trade are prohibited generally from 
engaging third-party undertakings discernible to the public to handle internet sales, 
irrespective of whether the manufacturer’s legitimate quality standards are contravened in the 
specific case?”26 
 
In addition, the national court inquired about the interpretation of arts 4(b)–4(c) of the VBER (on 
hardcore restrictions that remove the benefit of the block exemption), asking whether a prohibition on 
engaging third-party undertakings discernible to the public to handle internet sales that is imposed on 
the members of a selective distribution system constitutes a restriction on the retailers’ customer 
group “by object”, and whether such a prohibition constitutes a restriction of passive sales to end-
users “by object”.27 
 
Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
By way of background, AG Wahl noted that selective distribution may contribute to diversification of 
goods and quality, even though, in principle, it also creates restrictions on competition.28 Further, the 
ECJ has previously recognised the legality of selective distribution systems based on qualitative 
criteria.29 Selective distribution helps maintain brand image and stimulates inter-brand competition. 
Not only do luxury brands derive added value from a particular way in which products are presented, 
but selective distribution may also enable a brand to penetrate geographically distant markets while 
ensuring that the brand is represented in the same—presumably high-quality—manner.30 In selective 
distribution, all distributors are subject to the same criteria and conditions: their playing field is level. 
Intra-brand (price) competition is limited, as is the number of distributors. Nevertheless, the 
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30 Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [41]–[43]. 
organisers of selective distribution are not incentivised to behave anti-competitively: restricting the 
criteria for joining their systems to an ultimately anti-competitive degree would result in extremely 
limited distribution of goods, loss of market and loss of consumers.31 Because of differing possible 
effects, selective distribution must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.32 
As to preliminary ruling questions one and two, the AG took the view that a selective distribution 
system aimed at preserving the luxury image of luxury or prestige products should be viewed as 
compatible with art.101(1) TFEU.33 He underlined that if the Metro criteria are fulfilled, a selective 
distribution system is not caught by art.101(1).34 Moreover, the Metro criteria had to be observed even 
in evaluating an individual contract clause. AG Wahl concluded that a clause prohibiting the 
discernible use of third-party platforms could be justified, proportionate and otherwise lawful, but 
noted that this would be for the national court to determine.35  
The AG clarified that the issue underpinning the third and fourth questions was whether the clause at 
issue restricted territory and/or customers, or passive sales, within the meaning of the VBER.36 He 
remarked that since undertakings themselves must evaluate the applicability of the exemption granted 
under art.101(3) TFEU and the VBER, the interest of legal certainty requires robust self-evaluation 
criteria.37 AG Wahl noted that it was not evident that the contract clause at issue should be considered 
a restriction within the meaning of art.4(b) of the VBER. Further, no obvious, distinguishable 
geographical areas or groups of consumers would be lost to the distributor as a consequence of a 
prohibition on the discernible use of third-party platforms. Additionally, such a prohibition did not 
preclude online sales altogether and thus did not restrict passive sales to end-users within the meaning 
of art.4(c) of the VBER.38 Hence, the prohibition should not be considered a restriction of customers 
or passive sales under arts 4(b)–4(c).39 
Ruling by the ECJ 
 
The ECJ reasoned similarly to the AG but the judgment is significantly more concise. With respect to 
the first question, the ECJ emphasised that selective distribution systems are compatible with 
art.101(1) TFEU if the Metro criteria are met.40 As to the issue of whether selective distribution might 
be necessary in the case of luxury goods, the ECJ, recalling earlier case law, explained that the quality 
of luxury goods originates not only from their properties but also from an “aura of luxury” related to 
their prestigious image and allure. The aura enables consumers to distinguish those products, and any 
damage to the aura could damage the quality.41 Selective distribution systems which ensure that 
products are displayed and marketed so as to enhance their luxury image can contribute to 
maintaining an aura of luxury and thus quality. Further, luxury goods may be considered to require a 
                                                
31 Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [44]. 
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39 Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [157]. 
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41 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [25]. See also Copad SA v Christian Dior couture SA, Vincent Gladel and 
Société industrielle lingerie (SIL) (C-59/08) EU:C:2009:260 at [24]–[26]. Note also earlier judgments by the 
General Court, in particular Leclerc v Commission (T-88/92) EU:T:1996:192 at [105]–[117]. 
selective distribution system in order to preserve quality.42 Therefore, if the Metro criteria are met, a 
selective distribution system designed to preserve a luxury image is compatible with art.101(1) 
TFEU.43 
The ECJ continued by addressing diverging interpretations of Pierre Fabre (also put forward by 
parties and interveners). The ECJ underlined that paragraph 46 of Pierre Fabre, concerning art.101(1) 
TFEU, must be interpreted in a case-contextual light. In Pierre Fabre, a contract term completely 
precluded online sales, and the products could hardly have been considered luxury goods but rather 
cosmetic and hygiene products. Further, the compatibility of the entire selective distribution system 
with competition law was not at issue. Thus, the reasoning observable in Pierre Fabre was not 
directly applicable to a case such as the one before the Court.44 
With respect to the second question—concerning the lawfulness under art. 101(1) TFEU of a clause 
prohibiting the discernible use of third-party platforms in the distribution of luxury goods—the ECJ 
emphasised the relevance of the Metro criteria, and that it is for the referring court to determine 
whether these criteria are met.45 The ECJ observed that fulfilment of the criterion concerning 
proportionality was still to be assessed, while other criteria appeared to have been met in the particular 
circumstances of the case.46 
The ECJ proceeded to provide the national court “with all the points of interpretation of EU law” for 
evaluating fulfilment of the remaining criterion.47 First, the ECJ discussed the appropriateness of the 
platform ban, concluding that it was appropriate. The ECJ noted, for example, that as the object was 
to ensure that goods would be exclusively associated with authorised distributors, a prohibition on 
using third-party platforms in a discernible manner was a limitation “coherent in the light of the 
specific characteristics of the selective distribution system”.48 Further, the prohibition provided a 
guarantee for the supplier that its products would be sold in an environment corresponding to the 
qualitative conditions agreed with authorised distributors. Since the supplier had no legal recourse 
against third parties (platform operators) in terms of requiring compliance with quality standards, 
distribution via platforms would involve a “risk of deterioration of the online presentation” of the 
goods, so that the luxury image might be harmed.49Additionally, the exclusivity of online shops for 
particular products contributed to a luxury image and to preservation of one of the main 
characteristics of the goods.50 
Next, the ECJ examined whether the prohibition went beyond what is necessary to achieve its 
objective. The ECJ again rejected the analogy with Pierre Fabre—the clause at issue in Coty allowed 
sales via the distributors’ own online shops, and even through third-party platforms as long as these 
were used in an indiscernible way.51 Moreover, the ECJ remarked that the Commission’s E-commerce 
Sector Inquiry suggests that distributors generally consider their own online shops as the main 
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48 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [44]–[45]. 
49 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [47]–[49]. 
50 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [50]. 
51 See Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [52]–[53]. 
distribution channel.52 Consequently, the prohibition did not appear to go beyond what was necessary 
to preserve the luxury image of the goods. It was noted that the prohibition seemed lawful but it was 
for the national court to conduct the final evaluation, applying the Metro criteria.53  
As to the block exemption questions, which were examined together, the ECJ emphasised that the 
VBER is relevant only if the agreement at issue restricts competition within the meaning of art.101(1) 
TFEU.54 The ECJ continued that, in applying arts 4(b)–4(c) of the VBER, it must be resolved whether 
a contract pre-limits the customers to whom the goods can be sold or passive sales to end-users. The 
ECJ, significantly following AG Wahl’s Opinion, underlined that the prohibition at issue in Coty did 
not prevent all online marketing. Furthermore, it appeared practically impossible to determine the 
group of third-party online platform customers that would be lost to distributors as a result of a 
platform ban. Moreover, regardless of the prohibition on the discernible use of third-party platforms, 
distributors’ own online shops could be found through search engines, while authorised distributors 
remained able to utilise even third parties subject to certain conditions.55 The conclusion was that the 
prohibition did not amount to a hardcore restriction within the meaning of arts 4(b)–4(c) of the 
VBER.56 This signifies that an agreement containing a clause such as that at issue in Coty could 





The Coty ruling is essentially in line with the majority of earlier case law on selective distribution, and 
thus springs no great surprises. The ECJ has established that selective distribution systems based on 
qualitative criteria may—subject to the Metro test—be compatible with art.101(1) TFEU; indeed, it 
has become generally accepted that under certain conditions such systems may have pro-competitive 
effects.57 A major implication of Coty is the reassurance it provides for suppliers acting as organisers 
of selective distribution systems. Protecting a luxury image legitimises the prohibition of sales via 
third-party online platforms, that is, through online channels that could negatively affect the aura of 
luxury. The opposite conclusion would have incentivised vertical integration (keeping the distribution 
network within the same company thereby securing the protection of a luxury image) as opposed to 
using separate distributors. By addressing ambiguities related, in particular, to evaluation under 
art.101(1) TFEU and interpretation of Pierre Fabre, the ruling in Coty contributes to more uniform 
application of EU competition law in Member States. 
 
The Coty judgment discusses both the prohibition in art.101(1) TFEU and the possibility of exemption 
under the VBER (and art.101(3) TFEU). A Metro criteria fulfilling agreement on selective 
distribution falls outside the scope of art.101(1) TFEU, as illustrated by the ECJ’s reasoning on 
                                                
52 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [54]. See further Commission, “Final Report on the E-commerce Sector 
Inquiry” COM(2017) 229 final, paras 39–41. 
53 See Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [55]–[58]. 
54 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [59]. 
55 See Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [60]–[67]. See also Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-230/16) 
EU:C:2017:603 at [143]–[155]. 
56 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [68]–[69]. 
57 See fn.8, and further Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v Commission (107/82) 
EU:C:1983:293 at [33]–[35]; Copad (C-59/08) EU:C:2009:260. See also Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-
230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [33]–[34], [37]–[48], [64]–[66], and, e.g. L. Vogel, “Efficiency versus Regulation: 
The Application of EU Competition Law to Distribution Agreements” (2013) 4 Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 277. 
preliminary ruling questions one and two. If an agreement is caught by the prohibition, the possibility 
of an exemption under art.101(3) TFEU and the VBER must be assessed—questions three and four 
concerned that evaluation.  
 
Nonetheless, the terminology used by the referring court was ambiguous when referring to restraints 
meant in arts 4(b)–4(c) of the VBER: the national court inquired about restrictions “by object”,58 
while the title of art.4 of the VBER refers to “hardcore restrictions”.59 It may be this ambiguity that 
has spurred discussion concerning the issue of whether the ECJ’s analysis of art.4 of the VBER 
provides information on some more general approach to third-party platform bans. In particular, the 
question has been raised whether the ECJ’s reasoning implies that platform bans are other than “by 
object” restrictions under art.101(1) TFEU.60  
 
In general art.101(1) TFEU analysis, restrictions on competition are restrictions either “by object” or 
“by effect”. The relationship between a restriction “by object” and a “hardcore restriction” may 
appear confusing; indeed, the expressions are even used as synonyms.61 As underlined by AG Wahl in 
Coty, hardcore restrictions within the meaning of the VBER and restrictions “by object” under 
art.101(1) TFEU must be distinguished, but their characteristics may be similar and partially 
overlapping since in both cases assessment focuses on the harmfulness of the measure under 
scrutiny.62  
 
It should be noted that in Coty, the ECJ’s answers to preliminary ruling questions three and four are 
worded so that they strictly concern interpretation of art.4 of the VBER: the ruling clarifies that the 
prohibition on using third-party platforms in selective distribution of luxury goods in a discernible 
manner is not a hardcore restriction under arts 4(b)–4(c) of the VBER, that is, not a restriction that has 
as its object the restriction of customers or passive sales to end-users within the meaning of the 
VBER.63 The ECJ did not discuss the matter of restrictions “by object” or “by effect” under the 
art.101(1) TFEU prohibition. While answering preliminary ruling question number two on the 
compatibility of a third-party platform ban with art.101(1) TFEU, the ECJ emphasised the national 
                                                
58 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [20]. 
59 Regulation 330/2010 [2010] OJ L102/1, art.4. The text of art.4 discusses restrictions which have “as their 
object”, for instance, restriction of customers, or restriction of active or passive sales to end-users. 
60 See, e.g. P. Ibáñez Colomo, “Case C-230/16, Coty Germany GmbH: Common Sense Prevails” (6 December 
2017) https://chillingcompetition.com/, https://chillingcompetition.com/2017/12/06/c%E2%80%91230-16-coty-
germany-gmbh-common-sense-prevails/ [accessed 1 April 2018]. 
61 For discussion, see Gurin and Peeperkorn, “Vertical Agreements” in The EU Law of Competition (2014), 
p.1390; De la Mano and Jones, “Vertical Agreements” (2017); J. Goyder, “Cet Obscur Objet: Object 
Restrictions in Vertical Agreements” (2011) 2 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 327; A. Witt, 
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“Restrictions of Competition by Object under Article 101 TFEU” (2012) 49 C.M.L. Rev. 559; P. Ibáñez Colomo 
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Know We Know” in B. Meyring, D. Gerard and M. Merola (eds), The Notion of Restriction of Competition, 
Revisiting the Foundations of Antitrust Enforcement in Europe (Brussels: Bruylant, 2017), pp.333, 350–358. 
62 Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [56]. See also at [116]–[117], [124]–[125], [132]–
[138]. See further, e.g. Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v Commission (C-67/13 P) EU:C:2014:2204 at 
[53]–[58]; Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt and Others v Gazdasági Versenyhivatal (C-32/11) EU:C:2013:160 at 
[33]–[38], [43]–[48]; T-Mobile Netherlands and Others (C-8/08) EU:C:2009:343 at [29]. 
63 See Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [68]–[70], and reasoning at [59]–[67]. 
court’s assessment of the Metro criteria in the circumstances of the case,64 but this does not signify 
that the restriction is “by effect”.65 
 
When caught by art.101(1) TFEU, agreements on selective distribution are restrictions “by object”,66 
and in Coty the ECJ did not expressly depart from this. However, it can be noted that AG Wahl 
remarked that the prohibition on using third-party platforms in a discernible manner should not be 
considered a “by object” restriction under art.101(1) TFEU.67 
 
In terms of general practical implications of Coty, it can be pointed out that for practising lawyers and 
companies, the “logic” of art.101 TFEU/VBER analysis is often reversed: it is usually considered 
reasonable to first assess the overall applicability of the VBER, including the relevance of market 
share thresholds, and then proceed to a detailed evaluation of the agreement under art.101 TFEU only 
after finding that a contract is unlikely to benefit from the block exemption.68 Coty does not 
significantly affect this general (and partially problematic) centrality of exemptions of vertical 
agreements, although of course it clarifies the legal framework in situations resembling the Coty case. 
 
An additional matter to highlight is the role of national courts and the ECJ, as well as cooperation 
between courts, when applying EU competition law, and the Metro criteria in particular. In Coty, the 
ECJ stated that the platform ban at issue is lawful under art.101(1) TFEU if the Metro criteria are met, 
which in turn should be determined by the referring court. Nonetheless, it was the task of the ECJ to 
provide the national court “with all the points of interpretation of EU law which will enable it to reach 
a decision”.69 This approach is also observable in earlier case law.70 In Coty, the ECJ noted that 
meeting the other criteria appeared clear on the basis of the case file, but evaluating proportionality 
still remained.71 The ECJ then discussed the criterion and its elements comprehensively.72 
 
While it is generally known that the role of the ECJ is to clarify the interpretation of EU law and it 
remains the task of national judiciaries to apply the law to facts,73 it is observable that national courts 
may in practice receive highly detailed instructions in selective distribution cases. This practice of the 
                                                
64 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [57]–[58], [70]. 
65 See, e.g. CB (C-67/13 P) EU:C:2014:2204 at [53]–[58]; Pierre Fabre (C-439/09) EU:C:2011:649 at [34]–
[47]. 
66 See Pierre Fabre (C-439/09) EU:C:2011:649 at [39]. 
67 Wahl underlined that the concept of restriction “by object” should only refer to restrictions that are so 
obviously harmful that evaluation of the effects is unnecessary, and that the concept should be interpreted 
restrictively. See Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [116]–[118], and further CB (C-
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69 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [40]–[41]. 
70 See in particular L'Oréal (31/80) EU:C:1980:289 at [14]–[20]. See also Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-
230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [66]–[70]. 
71 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [42]–[43]. 
72 See Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [44]–[58]. 
73 See, e.g. Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio (C-295/97) EU:C:1999:313. See also, e.g. A. 
Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp.96, 104–114; N. 
Fennelly, “The National Judge as Judge of the European Union” in A. Rosas, E. Levits and Y. Bot (eds), The 
Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-Law (The 
Hague: Asser Press, 2013), pp.61, 77–78. 
ECJ could be said to intertwine the interpretation of EU law with the application of that law to the 
facts. In other words, national courts are left with little room for discretion.  
 
Prohibition of the Discernible Use of Third-Party Platforms versus Total Ban on Online Sales 
 
Interpretation of Pierre Fabre 
 
Coty makes it clear that the controversial paragraph 46 of Pierre Fabre (on art.101(1) TFEU) is to be 
interpreted narrowly and read in the context of that case. Thus, Coty settles ambiguities stemming 
from the relationship between Pierre Fabre and other case law on selective distribution.74 As for 
selective distribution systems “for luxury goods designed, primarily, to preserve the luxury image of 
those goods” and their compatibility with art.101(1) TFEU, the state of EU law is now clearer. The 
ruling in Coty underlines that third-party platforms significantly differ from an authorised distributor’s 
own website in that the supplier no longer has proper control over the presentation and image of 
goods when sold on such platforms.75 
 
Effects of Prohibiting and Allowing Online Sales and Third-Party Platforms in Vertical Agreements  
 
With a view to practical or economic effects, prohibiting the use of third-party platforms differs 
significantly from a total prohibition on online sales in distribution.76 The restrictive nature of a total 
online sales ban was underlined when the ECJ found such a ban a restriction “by object” in Pierre 
Fabre.77 In light of that ruling, it appears in theory possible that a total online sales ban passes the 
Metro test in an individual case where for instance the nature of the contract product genuinely 
legitimises the ban, but this is not likely to happen often.78 E-commerce is a major catalyst for (price) 
competition, and an attempt to avoid distribution via the internet must be seen against this 
background. An absolute prohibition on online sales has appreciable implications in terms of reaching 
customers outside a distributor’s local area, and essentially prevents passive sales. Moreover, it can be 
apparent that such a prohibition does not produce notable pro-competitive effects and that it is not a 
proportionate measure to address risks of counterfeiting and free-riding.79 
 
A prohibition of the discernible use of third-party platforms, for its part, signifies that a type of online 
sales is precluded, although otherwise selling and marketing on the internet remains possible. The 
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76 See also Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [32]–[35], [52]–[56], [65]; Opinion of AG Wahl in Coty (C-
230/16) EU:C:2017:603 at [74]–[117]. 
77 Pierre Fabre (C-439/09) EU:C:2011:649 at [38]–[47]. 
78 See Pierre Fabre (C-439/09) EU:C:2011:649 at [43]–[47]. The ECJ concludes at [47]: “a contractual clause 
requiring sales of cosmetics and personal care products to be made in a physical space where a qualified 
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notes, citing case law on the freedoms of movement, that it has not accepted “arguments relating to the need to 
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the context of non-prescription medicines and contact lenses, to justify a ban on internet sales”.  
79 See also, e.g. Opinion of AG Mazák in Pierre Fabre (C-439/09) EU:C:2011:113 at [39]–[57]. 
prohibition facilitates preserving the guarantees of quality and identification of the origin of products 
and contributes to protecting a brand in the face of the phenomena of counterfeiting and free-
riding/parasitism.80 Under this kind of prohibition, the extent to which third parties are actually relied 
on in distribution depends on the usefulness of indiscernible cooperation and on the arrangements 
third parties are willing to agree on.81 In some situations, a prohibition on the discernible use of 
platforms may in practice have the same effects as a total platform ban. 
 
In the case of a prohibition of any use of third-party platforms, sales through the distributors’ own 
online stores again remain possible. Other practical implications depend on several factors, such as 
the type of product and the size of the distributor company. For example, the role of platforms in sales 
of clothing, shoes, and consumer electronics is already notable in the EU.82 In particular, small and 
medium-sized companies benefit from the infrastructure (such as regarding payments) and visibility 
provided by third-party platforms.83 Further, the significance of general online platforms is greater in 
some geographical areas.84 Nevertheless, the E-commerce Sector Inquiry suggests that currently even 
absolute third-party platform bans do not generally amount to de facto prohibitions of online sales.85 
 
As an aside, it can be remarked that online marketplaces themselves benefit from being able to 
provide a large selection of products and brands. It is not surprising that an industry lobby group, to 
which several major platform operators belong, should issue a statement arguing for the limited 
relevance of Coty for products other than luxury products.86 
 
It may be argued that the Coty ruling reduces competition in consumer sales.87 Nonetheless, this is not 
the case in practice if suppliers choose between utilising a selective distribution system with a third-
party platform ban and arranging distribution themselves without using general platforms. Further, as 
underlined by the ECJ and the AG, focusing solely on price competition would be misguided in this 
context: selective distribution may promote inter-brand competition, specialist trade and 
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EU:C:2017:603 at [101]–[106]; Commission, “Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Final 
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ENTR/300/PP/2013/FC-WIFO, European Commission, 2017), pp.11–22. 
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83 See, e.g. Commission, “Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry” COM(2017) 229 final, paras 14, 39, 
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Commission, “Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Final Report on the E-commerce Sector 
Inquiry” SWD(2017) 154 final, paras 504, 514. 
85 Commission, “Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry” COM(2017) 229 final, para.41. 
86 See H. Greenfield, “Court of Justice of the EU Delivers Judgment in Coty Germany Case on Online 
Marketplace Bans” (Computer and Communications Industry Association CCIA, 6 December 2017), 
http://www.ccianet.org/2017/12/court-of-justice-of-the-eu-delivers-judgment-in-coty-germany-case-on-online-
marketplace-bans/ [accessed 1 April 2018].  
87 See, e.g. the previous fn., and PYMNTS, “EU Says Luxury Retailers Can Keep Their Goods off of Amazon” 
(PYMNTS, 6 December 2017), https://www.pymnts.com/, 
https://www.pymnts.com/news/regulation/2017/amazon-eu-luxury-coty/ [accessed 1 April 2018]. See also 
Wartinger and Solek, “Restrictions of Third-Party Platforms” (2016) 39 World Competition 300. 
diversification of goods, and thus benefit consumers.88 Moreover, in e-commerce, price competition is 
intensified by the new possibilities of the digital environment (that affect transparency and monitoring 
prices), which may overemphasise price at the cost of product quality.89 Therefore, contractual 
arrangements aimed at protecting quality or diversification may be considered even more beneficial 
than previously. Additionally, price competition in online sales of non-luxury cosmetics, for example, 
may remain essentially unaffected by the Coty ruling, so that consumers preferring low prices, and 
possibly lower quality, continue to benefit from platform-fuelled competition. 
 
Vertical Agreements and the Online Environment: Further Remarks 
 
The ECJ’s approach to the interpretation of arts 4(b)–4(c) of the VBER is reasonable and in line with 
the Commission’s views. The fact that “third-party platform customers” cannot be distinguished as a 
clearly separate group and the fact that online sales and marketing remain possible regardless of a 
prohibition on the discernible use of third-party platforms, signifies that another interpretation would 
not have been easy to justify. The wording of the provisions does not indicate that a third-party 
platform ban was meant to be included in the hardcore restraints, and no evident market partitioning 
or customer-sharing results from such a ban.90 If, in the future, it is possible to recognise the group of 
third-party platform customers and clearly distinguish this group from customers who make their 
purchases via other channels,91 then the nature of a third-party online marketplace ban as a restriction 
on customers, or territories, would have to be reconsidered. 
 
Moreover, as AG Wahl underlined, legal certainty, predictability, and the purpose of the VBER 
require that hardcore restrictions within the meaning of art.4 of the VBER are as easy to recognise as 
possible.92 Thus, the provision should not be interpreted over-broadly. However, even where no 
hardcore restrictions within the meaning of art.4 of the VBER are present, general incompatibility 
with art.101(3) TFEU could still render a vertical agreement illegal. The applicability of a block 
exemption signifies that an agreement is presumed lawful, but this does not signify that there would 
be a final decision regarding the matter. The Commission and national competition authorities have 
the power to withdraw the benefit of a block exemption in a particular case if they find that an 
exemption is not justified.93 In practice, though, such withdrawals do not appear common.94  
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93 See, in particular, Regulation 330/2010 [2010] OJ L102/1, recitals 5, 10, 13–15 (and also art.6 concerning 
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Discussion is ongoing regarding the revision of rules and guidelines applicable to vertical restraints in 
the EU. The need to adapt the treatment of vertical agreements to the problems of digital markets has 
particularly been highlighted by commentators.95 Further, the Commission has recognised that the 
current Vertical Guidelines and the VBER are not necessarily optimal for resolving dilemmas in the 
online environment. Commissioner Vestager has emphasised the importance of gathering experience 
from assessing new cases, and observed that following the development of digital markets is 
essential.96 The E-commerce Sector Inquiry included the conclusion that revising the VBER—which 
expires in May 2022—need not be carried out earlier than originally planned. Nonetheless, the 
Commission notes that Sector Inquiry data, as well as information gathered in the context of targeted 
enforcement triggered by the Inquiry, will contribute to future review.97 
 
Moreover, legal issues related to online platforms, and the position and behaviour of major platforms, 
are comprehensively scrutinised under the DSM Strategy.98 This work, which entails analysis from 
the standpoint of different fields of law, including unfair contract term issues, is still in progress, but 
may have implications for contractual chains that include platforms.99  
 
All in all, the legal framework applicable to vertical agreements in digital markets is developing, 
although slowly. In any case, the Coty ruling, the VBER, the Vertical Guidelines and the 
Commission’s approaches currently form a significantly coherent whole with respect to treatment of 
third-party platform bans in selective distribution. 
 
Quality, Luxury and Prestige 
 
Competition law analysis of selective distribution under art.101(1) TFEU enquires whether 
contractual restrictions are necessary in order to protect product quality or to ensure proper product 
use.100 Nevertheless, the case law terminology is more nuanced and discusses not merely quality but 
also “prestige” and “luxury”.101 Luxury products are one group of products whose quality may require 
protection.102 In any event, the specific relevance of luxury for the ECJ’s reasoning is of interest in 
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assessing the implications of Coty. The ruling affirms that “a selective distribution system for luxury 
goods designed, primarily, to preserve the luxury image of those goods” complies with art.101(1) 
TFEU as long as the Metro criteria are met.103 The same applies to a prohibition on the discernible use 
of third-party platforms.104 These conclusions appear to strictly focus on luxury goods. Luxury goods 
are also mentioned in the answer regarding interpretation of art.4 of the VBER.105 
 
As regards the ECJ’s detailed analysis of art.4 of the VBER, luxury is of no visible significance, and 
Coty reveals no differences in evaluation between luxury goods and other products. As seen above, 
the ECJ focused on the potential effects of a platform ban.106 On the basis of the contents and wording 
of arts 4(b)–4(c) of the VBER, the luxury nature of contract products is not relevant.107 
 
With respect to the interpretation of art.101(1) TFEU, the involvement of luxury products and a 
luxury image seems to have been a major reason for arriving at a different conclusion than that in 
Pierre Fabre.108 Further, the ECJ recalled the trademark case of Copad, where the quality of luxury 
goods was expressly linked with their allure, prestigious image and aura of luxury.109 Relying 
significantly on Copad, the ECJ concluded that luxury goods may require a selective distribution 
system in order to preserve quality, and therefore a system designed “to preserve the luxury image” is 
legal.110 While discussing the second preliminary ruling question about the platform ban, the ECJ also 
used the expressions “luxury and prestige goods” and “the image of luxury and prestige”.111 Thus, 
guidance by the ECJ on art.101(1) TFEU is limited to luxury (and prestige) products. Nevertheless, 
the argument concerning the absence of contractual relationships between the supplier and third-party 
platforms and the related lack of possibilities to control presentation of products could apply more 
generally to preserving quality.112 Even more broadly, reasoning analogous to that observable in Coty 
could be utilised in the context of different kinds of products, when it comes to potentially harming or 
protecting quality, or even a particular “aura”.113 
 
Coty confirms that the treatment of luxury products under competition law is analogous to that in 
trademark cases. While this expression of consistency of EU law is welcome, competition law differs 
from trademark law in terms of the manner in which it is determined whether the product image 
requires particular protection. In competition matters, the ECJ enjoys notable discretion in defining 
luxury or high-quality products. In Coty, the role of the ECJ as the final “arbiter of luxury” is visible 
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104 Coty (C-230/16) EU:C:2017:941 at [58], [70]: “a contractual clause ... which prohibits authorised distributors 
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in a comparison between the facts of Pierre Fabre and Coty, with the Court noting on the contract 
products of the Pierre Fabre case that: “the goods ... were not luxury goods, but cosmetic and body 
hygiene goods.114 However, the difference between the contract products in Coty and in Pierre Fabre 




Coty clarifies several matters but it is not exhaustive. Legal issues of platform bans as well as other 
matters pertaining to contract terms designed to protect product image may continue to pose 
challenges. Additionally, the practical application of the Metro criteria (art.101(1) TFEU assessment) 
may be an exercise where national competition authorities and courts reach partially diverging 
conclusions. Besides, the importance of third-party platforms compared to distributors’ own online 
stores appears to vary from one Member State to another.115 This is relevant for evaluating the 
practical significance and proportionality of a third-party platform ban.116 Similarly, the role of 
general online marketplaces may change with time, affecting the assessment of platform bans under 
the Metro criteria. 
 
Moreover, in Coty, preliminary ruling questions two to four were narrow and context-specific. In turn, 
the ECJ carefully limited its answers to the particular issues raised by the referring court. For 
example, the ECJ only addressed the issue of platform bans in the context of selective distribution, 
while the treatment of such bans outside selective distribution remains partially open.117 Nevertheless, 
in contexts other than selective distribution, the practical role of platform bans is often less central. 
Generally, reasons for adopting platform restrictions and selective distribution systems are similar and 
therefore these two easily coincide.118 
 
In all, the ECJ’s reasoning concerning third-party online platform bans in Coty is an important 
addition to the law of digital markets. Coty is without doubt a central case for contemporary EU 
competition law.  
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